In this paper, we analyze the timing of promotions in academic departments. Contrary to previous attempts in the empirical literature, we test alternative theories of fast tracks by adding a measure of performance in our analysis. We …nd that learning from past performance is an important factor to explain the time spent as assistant and associate professor. In addition, our analysis shows the existence of a handicapping policy: individuals who had a fast promotion in the past are less likely to be promoted quickly again. We also …nd that the handicap is relative, that it does not survive the whole career and that it is possible for these individuals to beat it if they achieve a given level of productivity. We interpret our …nd-ings as evidence that incentives and sorting matter in academia and that using relative handicaps can help to balance these two concerns. Finally, we look at the productivity pattern of individuals with di¤erent career pro…les and …nd that fast tracks are always more productive than their pairs, even after the last promotion, what suggests an e¤ective selection process.
Introduction
Economists have only recently devoted a lot of attention to careers in organizations. One speci…c aspect which has been analyzed is whether there are systematic fast tracks, i.e. whether agents promoted quickly at one level are promoted more quickly at the next level. Evidence from sociology [Rosenbaum (1979) , Brüderl et al. (1991) , Podolny and Baron (1997) ] and economics [Baker et al. (1994) , Ariga et al. (1999) ] suggests that this is the case. But the question of why this is observed remains open. Baker et al. (1994) interpret this …nding as evidence of learning about individual ability, while Ariga et al. (1999) suggest that more elaborate models incorporating …rm speci…c human capital acquisition are needed to explain their results.
In contrast, the theoretical literature has rather studied why organizations might deliberately choose to favor the winner of the …rst round in the second round of a multi period contest. Several theoretical explanations have been proposed to explain this feature. The …rm can decide to act this way to induce human capital acquisition [Prendergast (1992) ]. Under asymmetric learning, the …rm can have incentives to exaggerate promotion prospects. Therefore, a credible way to signal high ability can be to promote the worker to a more di¢ cult task. An early promotion reveals information on future promotion prospects and induces investment in human capital, but at the cost of ine¢ cient task allocation. Under symmetric learning 1 , …rms can use di¤erent training policies to induce human capital accumulation. When wages can not be renegotiated, the optimal training consists in handicapping the winner of the …rst round until the probability of winning the tournament is 1 2 . On the contrary, when wages can be renegotiated, the winner of the …rst round receives more training 2 .
The …rm can also …nd it optimal to introduce a bias in favor of the winner of the …rst round to improve the incentives of identical agents in the …rst period [Meyer (1992) ]. Even if the bias leads to a loss of incentives in the second period, it is outweighed by the gain of incentives in the …rst period. Biased contests can 1 This case is probably more suited to academia where an important dimension of individual performance, i.e. research, is easily observed. 2 The model assumes that talent is more important at the higher rank. This is a credible assumption in the case of …rms but could be dubious in the case of academic departments where tasks are relatively similar in all hierarchical levels.
also be optimal for learning purposes. If output is a stochastic function of ability but not of e¤ort, a win in the second period by the loser of the …rst period is informative under a positive bias while it is not the case under no bias [Meyer (1991) ]. However, when both learning and incentives matter, these di¤erent objectives can be con ‡icting : "When the …rst-period result is informative about relative abilities, the e¤ort-maximizing bias in the second period will typically favor the …rst-period loser, o¤setting the probable di¤erence in abilities. (...)
Hence the choice of second period bias might have opposite implications for employee incentives and for learning by the organization and which employee should be favored may depend on the relative sensitivity to bias of pre-promotion and post-promotion pro…ts" [Meyer (1992) , pp 182-183].
There also exists other potential situations where the bias could favor the loser [Meyer (1992) ]. If the loss of promoting the less able exceeds the gain from promoting the more able, and if the principal has the choice to promote neither of the contestants, then the optimal strategy is to set a negative bias for the leader, and promote him at the end of the second period only if he wins the second race as well. Otherwise, nobody is promoted.
While the previous papers consider a two period set-up where the timing of each period is …xed, they can nevertheless generate interesting predictions for the analysis of the timing of careers. In these models, the introduction of a bias is made by rewarding the winner or the loser of the …rst round with a promotion. When the time spent at a given layer is not …xed, a natural interpretation of these models is to consider that the bias can also be made via the speed of promotions. For example, a positive [negative] bias is introduced if a fast promotion at the …rst layer implies a fast [slow] promotion at the second layer.
Our analysis is in the vein of recent empirical exercises that have analyzed fast tracks using …rm's personnel records. Baker et al. (1994) use data of a medium-sized U.S. …rm in a service industry. They show the promotions and exit rates by tenure at the second level of the hierarchy versus the time to promotion from the …rst to the second level. They …nd that "holding tenure constant, promotion rates decrease with tenure in the previous level", providing evidence of a learning process about the agent's ability. Another empirical paper that looks at the issue is Ariga et al. (1999) . They use personnel data from a large Japanese …rm in the manufacturing industry. They test econometrically whether the time spent in a lower level has an in ‡uence on the probability to be promoted in an upper level. careers. These …ndings can be explained by a will to balance incentives and sorting issues, as in an environment where performance is informative about relative abilities, incentives require a handicapping policy while the opposite is true for sorting. We o¤er alternative explanations for our results and propose simple tests to discriminate between them. We …nally look at the impact of di¤erent timing of careers on individual performance. We …nd that fast tracks are always more productive than their pairs, even after the last promotion, what suggests an e¤ective selection process.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset.
In section 3, we analyze the timing of promotions and test for the existence of fast tracks in our sample, using di¤erent de…nitions. Section 4 looks if di¤erent career paths lead to di¤erent behavior in research performance. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Data
The main dataset used is described in details in Coupé et al. (2003) . It provides information about the career and research performance of 652 top academic economists for the period 1969-1998. For each individual, we know how many years was spent in each rank before being promoted to the next. In this paper, we only consider a well de…ned subset of these individuals. We de…ne three conditions to include them in our analysis: (1) they must have become professor in 1998, (2) they have followed the hierarchical ladder and (3) Taking only individuals who have followed the hierarchical ladder is used for simpli…cation. We have also considered non hierarchical promotions and results were unchanged. The third conditions is also innocuous.
There is substantial heterogeneity among individuals as to how many years they spend in a given position, as shown in table 1. For all the individuals who were promoted to associate professor, the number of years they spent as assistant professor varies between 1 and 15 years. For individuals who were promoted to professor, a similar conclusion prevails. Some individuals are promoted quickly from rank 1 [assistant professor] to rank 2 [associate professor], and similarly from rank 2 to rank 3 [full professor]. We de…ne a fast track as someone who is promoted in a time span equal or lower than 3 years in each of the promotions. Table 2 reports the proportion of fast track in our sample. This is the case for 12.1% of the individuals. The largest proportion of individuals in our sample are promoted to the next level in more than three years during the two spells. N AST P , the number of years spent as assistant professor F AST 13, a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the individual is promoted from assistant to associate professor in 3 years or less and 0 otherwise
We also introduce two variables to describe a fast promotion from rank 2
[associate] to rank 3 [full professor]:
N ASSP , the number of years spent as associate professor F AST 23, a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the individual is promoted from associate to professor in 3 years or less and 0 otherwise A test for the existence of fast track is to see whether N AST P (or F AST 13)
has an e¤ect on N ASSP (or F AST 23). We control for the production since last promotion (P SLP ), which we interact with EXP to check whether new information becomes less valuable as the researcher becomes more experienced, in line with learning theory. The measure of production that we use is publications weighted by the impact factor of the journal. The impact factor is equal to the citations in year t to the articles published in journals J in t-1 and t-2 divided by the number of articles published in J in t-1 and t-2. This re ‡ects the number of citations that can be expected for an article published in J, measured one or two years after publications 3 . We perform the following standard OLS regressions:
and the following probit estimations: and that the loss of promoting the less able exceeds the gain from promoting the more able [Meyer (1991) ]. Therefore taking into account the performance of the second stage is needed to decide which individuals should be on a fast track.
We also checked whether this handicapping e¤ect was holding on when we considered only individuals in similar departments. This test allows to control for institution-speci…c e¤ect linked to reputation. We ran the same speci…cation as in table 4 by category of university 4 . We found that the time spent as assistant Speci…cation (1) and (3): OLS estimation, t-stat equivalent in parentheses;***/** denote resp. signi…cance at 1%/5% Speci…cation (2): probit estimation, marginal changes; t-stat equivalent in parentheses; ***/** denote resp. signi…cance at 1%/5% had a negative e¤ect on the time spent as associate in all categories of universities. However, the coe¢ cient was smaller for higher level universities, for which sorting might be a more important constraint 5 .
Up to now, we have de…ned a fast track with respect to the timing of each subsequent promotions. We could also use a broader de…nition and consider not only the time spent at each layer, but the whole time spent to attain the last level in the hierarchy. We use a new variable to describe a fast career: NFULL, the number of years spent before being promoted to professor. We run the following OLS regressions:
The third speci…cation of table 4A reports the estimates of the regressions of N F U LL. We can see that the handicap does not survive the whole career. Up to now, we have found that, after the …rst stage of the career, the fastest individuals are handicapped with respect to their slower colleagues. However, this handicap is relative, it only holds for the second stage and does not spread to the whole career path. Such a result could be explained by the need to balance incentives and sorting issues. In an environment where performance is informative about relative abilities, incentives would require a handicapping policy while the opposite is true for sorting. Therefore, designing handicaps that are in …ne relative could be a way to achieve the trade-o¤ between sorting and incentives.
Alternative Explanations

Human capital accumulation
We have interpreted our previous …ndings as evidence of handicapping policies for incentives and sorting reasons. However, an alternative explanation for these results could be human capital accumulation. If the accumulation of human capital is crucial for the …rm [in this case the university] and individuals do not di¤er much in their accumulation process, then those receiving a fast promotion at the beginning will have accumulated less human capital and will have to wait longer for their next promotion 6 . We therefore need to prove whether our results are due to a handicapping or to a human capital story. We perform the estimations of Eq. (2) and (4) Another way to test for the human capital hypothesis is the following: if human capital accumulation is all that matters for career paths, then individuals who were slow at the beginning should have better careers than those who were fast, due to a higher level of human capital 7 . The N F U LL speci…cation of previous subsection already showed us that being fast at the beginning leads to a better career in term of timing. We also look at the most successful academics [promoted to full professor in less than 7 years] and see what their …rst career path look like. Among the 67 (out of 312) who attain the level of full professor in less than 7 years, only 27% took more than 3 years to be promoted associate professor. Moreover, 55% of the quick assistant professors made it to full in less than 7 years while it was only the case for 8% of the slow assistant professors. This shows that the most successful individuals have spent few years at the …rst stage while the human capital accumulation hypothesis predicts the opposite. We therefore conclude that di¤erences in career pro…les can not only be explained by di¤erences in human capital accumulation.
Tenure
A potential problem that could undermine our results is that, in the previous regressions, we have considered both tenured and untenured associate professors. It could be that these individuals exhibit di¤erent behaviors and that the only potential candidates for fast tracks are the tenured associate professors
and not the whole sample. Therefore, not discriminating between the two could have led to biases in our results. To control for this possibility, we run the same regressions as before but only for the subsample of tenured associate professors. Estimates are provided in table 4B. We can see that the results remain unchanged. Di¤erences in tenure status can thus not explain our results.
Endogeneity issues
In the speci…cations used for the regressions of table 4A and 4B, we have used the number of years as assistant professor (N AST P ) as an explanatory variable. If N AST P is determined by the productivity of the individual during this period and if individual productivity is correlated across time, this could raise endogeneity issues. To address this problem, we follow a two steps strategy.
First, we regress N AST P over the performance when assistant and performance interacted with experience (Eq. (7)]. Then, we replace N AST P by its estimated value, N AST P E, in the estimation of N ASSP [Eq. (8)] .
Results are shown in table 5, [1st column of speci…cation (1)]. We can see that the e¤ect is even stronger than before once we control for endogeneity. Speci…cation (1) and (3): OLS estimation, t-stat equivalent in parentheses; ***/** denote resp. signi…cance at 1%/5% Speci…cation (2): probit estimation, marginal changes; t-stat equivalent in parentheses; ***/** denote resp. signi…cance at 1%/5% Because the residual ' i represents the unexplained part of the time spent as assistant, a negative value could be interpreted as a promotion that occurred earlier than it should have been. This allows us to do an extra test by using the residual as explanatory variable instead of N AST P :
We …nd that the …rst period noise is negatively related to the time spent as associate professor [table 5, 2nd column of speci…cation (1) years at each layer (not fast). Table 6 reports the average productivity three years and …ve years after being promoted full professor. We can see that three years after the promotion to full professor, the most productive individuals are the fast tracks, followed by the late fast and then the two other groups. The di¤erence in means is statistically signi…cant for the fast tracks (t-value of 2.0) and for the late fast (t-value of 2.0). Over a span of …ve years, the most productive are still the fast tracks but we can no longer discriminate between the three other groups (i.e.
the di¤erence is only statistically signi…cant for the fast tracks, t-value of 2.9).
These …gures show that the individuals who have the most successful careers are also the ones who are the best performers ex post. Therefore, early selection appears to be e¤ective "cherry picking".
Another interesting aspect is to see how the productivity of each group evolves along the career. In …gure 1, we …rst compare the pro…le of each of the four former groups. We can see that the fast tracks are not only the most productive individuals …ve years after the promotion to professor: they are the most productive along the whole career. This is especially striking at the beginning of the career while at the end, di¤erences vanish. We also use an alternative de…n-ition and split the sample in two groups, according to the number of years spent before being promoted to full professor [7 years being the separation point]. Experience Productivity more or equal than 7 years less than 7 years Figure 2 shows us that the conclusion is the same using this other de…nition:
the fast individuals are always the most productive, whatever the year in their career.
Previously, we have detected the existence of a handicapping policy for the faster academics of the …rst stage and we have shown that these individuals were able to beat the handicap if they were productive enough during the second stage. Our interpretation of these results was that the timing of the …rst stage was not informative enough to put an individual on a fast track and that taking into account other information, as the performance in the second stage, was needed to take such a decision. The present analysis comforts our previous argument that the purpose of such a decision was an e¤ective selection as fast tracks always exhibit a higher productivity than their pairs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the timing of promotions in academic departments. Contrary to previous attempts in the empirical literature, we have tested alternative theories of fast tracks by adding a measure of performance in our analysis. We have found that learning from past performance was an important factor to explain the time spent as assistant and associate professor. In addition, our analysis has shown the existence of a handicapping policy: individuals who had a fast promotion in the past were less likely to be promoted quickly again.
We have also seen that the handicap was relative and that it was possible for these individuals to beat it if they achieved a given level of productivity. When using a broader de…nition of being fast in academia, we have shown that the handicap did not hold for the whole career and that the individuals promoted quickly at the beginning were also the ones who experienced the fastest and most successful careers.
We have linked our results to incentives and sorting issues. To set a negative bias against those promoted quickly in the …rst stage can improve incentives for all contestants and reestablish a balanced contest, as it compensates for the likely di¤erences in ability. However, a strong handicap can be detrimental for sorting concerns, as it may lead to the selection of inadequate individuals [i.e.
give a promotion …rst to the less able]. We have interpreted our …ndings as evidence that incentives and sorting matter in academia and that using relative handicaps can help to balance these two concerns. We have also taken into account other potential explanations for our results, as human capital accumulation and tenure. We have shown that, even if they play a role, they can not explain our results on the timing of careers.
Finally, we have looked at the productivity pattern of individuals with different career pro…les. We have found that fast tracks are always the most productive academics, whatever the year of their career. The di¤erence is especially striking at the beginning of their career but they are also more productive than their pairs after the last promotion, what shows an e¢ cient selection process.
Our analysis suggests the need for richer datasets in order to improve our knowledge of the dynamics of careers.
